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issued an opinion affirming the court of appeal's decision. State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^f
13. In doing so, the supreme court left in tact the requirement that a defendant seeking to
challenge a plea on appeal must first move to withdraw the plea in the district court. Id.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

STEVEN R. PERRY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20000756-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence entered on unconditional guilty pleas
to possession of a controlled substance with the intent to engage in a clandestine lab
operation, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4(e) & 5837d-5(g) (1998), and possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (Supp. 2000) (in Add. A).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
This Court must first decide if defendant waived his claim that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance where he did not condition either of his pleas on that
claim. Absent waiver, did trial counsel render ineffective assistance when he arranged for
substitute counsel to appear on his behalf while he was out of the country in order to
ensure that the matter was continued until he could return?
Where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on
appeal, this Court decides the issue as a matter of law. State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32, f
20, 984 P.2d 376; State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). However, "[w]here the
record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom
simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." State
v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^[17, 12 P.3d 92 (noting "the general rule that record
inadequacies result in an assumption of regularity on appeal") (citing State v. Robertson,
932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are relevant to the issue on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance precursor with
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4(3) and 58-37d-5(g) (1998); possession of a controlled
2

substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (Supp.
2000); and possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000) (R. 3-5). Defendant hired Russell T. Doncouse to represent
him(R. 13-14). Thereafter, the following occurred:
Hearing
Date

Appearance

Substance

1) 8/25/99

Defendant and
Doncouse absent

Arraignment. Continued by previous phone call
from Mr. Doncouse due to scheduling conflict
(R. 18-19). Defendant is not incarcerated.

2) 9/8/99

Doncouse present

Arraignment. Preliminary hearing requested
and set (R. 22-23).

3) 10/6/99

Doncouse absent
until mid-Novemberout of the country

Preliminary hearing. Preliminary hearing
waived; speedy trial waived to pursue plea
negotiations; matter continued one month (R.
83:10/6/99:1-3).

4) 11/10/99 Doncouse absent
until January 2000

Status hearing. Negotiations not complete; trial
and pre-trial setting requested for after Mr.
Doncouse returns to town so that he can handle
the negotiations; trial is set for January 27 and
28 (R. 83:Tab2:l-3).

5) 12/22/99 Defendant absent.
Doncouse absent
until 1/19/00

Hearing on defendant's motion to continue.
Matter continued to permit notification to
defendant to appear to waive speedy trial right
(R. 36;83:Tab3:l-6).

6) 1/10/00

Hearing on defendant's motion to continue.
Defendant waives speedy trial right; trial re-set
to March 6 and 7 due to Mr. Doncouse's
unavailability to handle the plea negotiations (R.
83:Tab4:l-3).

Doncouse absent
until 1/19/00

3

7) 2/23/00

Doncouse absent
due to illness

Pre-trial conference. A plea offer has been
made; defendant and Mr. Doncouse have not yet
met about the offer; defendant requests a oneweek continuance, which requires that the trial
date be stricken; defendant waives his speedy
trial right; trial date is stricken and status
hearing scheduled (R. 83:Tab5:l-3).

8) 3/1/00

Doncouse absent
due to scheduling
conflict

Change of plea hearing. Negotiations are
complete and defendant enters guilty pleas to
a second and a third degree felony; a
misdemeanor drug charge is dismissed; a
presentence investigation report is ordered (R.
82:3/1/00:2-9).

9) 4/19/00

Doncouse present

Sentencing. Defendant requests one week
continuance due to the fact that Mr. Doncouse
received the presentence investigation report
within the previous 24 hours and needs more
time to prepare (R. 48-49).

10) 4/26/00

Doncouse present

Sentencing. Both parties present argument, and
the court orders a 60-day diagnostic evaluation
at the prison (R. 50-51; 82:4/26/00:3-23).
Defendant is incarcerated at the conclusion of
the hearing (R. 82:4/26/00:20-23).

11) 6/28/00 Doncouse absentOut of the country

Sentencing. Defendant "unexpectedly]"
questions the adequacy of Mr. Doncouse's
representation and seeks a continuance to hire
new counsel (R. 82:6/28/00:2-5).

12)7/19/00

New counsel appears and seeks a two-week
continuance to review the case; granted (R.
82:7/19/00:2-3).

13) 8/2/00

Sentencing. The parties present statements and
the court sentences defendant to an
indeterminate prison term of one-to-fifteen
years for the second degree felony, and no more
4

than five years for the third degree felony, to
run concurrently (R. 62-63; R. 82:8/2/00;17-19).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Acting pursuant to a tip that defendant had purchased a large amount of either red
phosphorous or iodine and was manufacturing methamphetamine, officers obtained and
executed a search warrant for defendant's home on June 15, 1999 (R. 82:3/1/00:5-6).
They found phosphorous, pseudoephedrine, and iodine in the home, all necessary
ingredients for manufacturing methamphetamine (R. 82:3/1/00:6). They also found
"finished" methamphetamine and marijuana, together with "a variety of pieces of lab"
(id.). Everything was consistent with manufacturing methamphetamine (id.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective because he sent substitute
counsel to appear in court numerous times on defendant's behalf while counsel himself
was out of town. However, defendant waived this non-jurisdictional claim of a pre-plea
constitutional violation when he entered his voluntary guilty pleas without making them
conditional on the preservation of this issue. Even if defendant's claim were properly
before the Court, it fails because it rests on a flawed premise, it is without record support,
and defendant fails to allege the requisite prejudice. To the extent there is any record
evidence related to the issue, it is contrary to defendant's claim.

l

The facts are taken from the prosecutor's uncontested recitation at the change of
plea hearing on March 1, 2000 (R. 82:3/1/00:5-7).
5

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WAS WAIVED BY ENTRY OF HIS UNCONDITIONAL
GUILTY PLEAS; FURTHER, IT FAILS BECAUSE DEFENDANT
HAS NEITHER PROVIDED ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR THE
CLAIM NOR ESTABLISHED PREJUDICE
Defendant contends that his chosen counsel rendered ineffective assistance below
by appearing in court for only one often hearings before defendant hired new counsel.
Br. of Aplt. at 7-11. Defendant argues that this left him at the mercy of substitute
counsel, without his consent, who knew little or nothing about the facts of the case or the
relevant law and who made no attempt to "properly" discuss the case before appearing in
court. Id at 7, 9-11. This also allegedly prevented defendant from consulting with or
being advised by his counsel at any stage of the proceedings, leaving him without an
understanding of the charges against him, the relevant law, or the State's burden of proof.
Id. Finally, defendant notes, without argument, that his counsel promised him a sentence
of probation and drug counseling. Id. at 10.
Defendant waived this claim of ineffectiveness when he entered his guilty pleas
without conditioning them on the right to challenge the effectiveness of his counsel's
performance. Further, the record is insufficient to support defendant's claims, which are
made for the first time on direct appeal. Moreover, those parts of the record having any
bearing on the issue are contrary to defendant's assertions. Finally, defendant received

6

what he wanted and what the numerous hearings were designed to achieve—his counsel's
involvement in negotiations and in resolving the case on defendant's behalf.
A.

Defendant Waived His Claim.
As a general rule, "a voluntary [and unconditional] guilty plea is a waiver of

the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues, including pre-plea constitutional violations."
State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 567 n.l (Utah App. 1994); see also State v. Parsons, 781
P.2d 1275,1278 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994); State v. Penman, 964 P.2d
1157, 1164 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah App. 1994);
State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah App. 1992); State ex rel. E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138,
138-39 (Utah App. 1991) (per curiam); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935,938 (Utah App. 1988).
Once a defendant has admitted his factual guilt by pleading guilty,"' [h]e may only attack the
voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea.'" Parsons, 781 P.2dat 1277-78 (quoting
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973)).
An exception to this general rule exists when the plea entered by the defendant, with
the consent of the prosecution and accepted by the trial court, specifically preserves an issue
for appeal and allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant prevails on appeal. See Serv, 758
P.2d at 938-39; State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 1990): see also Smith, 833
P.2d at 372.

7

Here, defendant's pleas were unconditional (R. 135:79-86). He does not challenge
the validity of his pleas, that is, their knowing and voluntary character.2 He complains only
that he was denied a nonjurisdictional constitutional right to effective assistance of trial
counsel before and during entrance of his pleas. Accordingly, defendant waived his claim
that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by entering voluntary guilty pleas that
were not conditioned on the right to appeal the issue.
B.

Because Defendant's Argument Rests on a Flawed Premise, He Failed to Develop
an Adequate Record to Support His Claim, and He Fails to Allege Prejudice, this
Court Should Presume that Counsel's Conduct was Within the Wide Range of
Reasonable Professional Assistance
Even if defendant's claim was properly before the Court, it would fail. Defendant

raises his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the first time on appeal through
new counsel. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant has the burden
of demonstrating "that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19, 12
P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064
(1984)). Defendant must then demonstrate "that counsel's deficient performance was
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." IcL (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687-88). Where a defendant fails to establish either prong of the test, this Court need look
no further and may reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Huggins,

2

See note 3, infra.
8

920 P.2d 1195,1199 (Utah App.) (for each of two claims of ineffectiveness, the court refuses
to reach one prong of the test where defendant fails to establish the other prong), cert denied.
929 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996); State v. PascuaL 804 P.2d 553,555 (Utah App. 1991) (as in "most
cases," the court disposes of the ineffectiveness claim based on defendant's failure to
demonstrate the requisite prejudice).
Further, the trial record must be adequate to allow for a determination on the merits
of the ineffectiveness claim. "[W]here, on direct appeal, [a] defendant raises a claim that
trial counsel was ineffective^] . . . defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is
adequate." Litherland. 2000 UT 76, f 16. "'If an appellant fails to provide an adequate
record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below.'" Id.
(quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997)) (additional citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[w]here the record appears inadequate in any
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of
a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. (noting "[t]his presumption is consistent
with the fundamental policies dictated by Strickland, see 466 U.S. at 689, [that] 'courts must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance,' and with the general rule that record inadequacies result in an
assumption of regularity on appeal") (citing Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1226).
In this case, the premise underlying defendant's claim is flawed. The mere fact that
counsel made provisions for substitute counsel to appear when he could not, without more,

9

is not per se deficient performance, and defendant does not establish that he was prejudiced
by substitute counsels' appearance. Defendant's unsubstantiated assertion that substitute
counsel "knew little about the facts or law" in this case and did not "properly" discuss the
case with defendant before each hearing does not establish that substitute counsel was
ineffective. Br. of Aplt. at 7, 9-11. As established infra, the hearings were all designed to
reschedule various court settings to permit lead counsel to handle the case upon his return.
Defendant was represented by counsel at all relevant hearings, and substitute counsel was
prepared to reschedule appearances according to Mr. .Doncouse's calendar.

Hence,

defendant's argument wholly fails to establish that the mere fact that his counsel arranged
for substitute counsel to appear on his behalf either "fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment" or was prejudicial. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19; see
also Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162 ("Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.") (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870
P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)).
Further, there is no record support for defendant's allegations of ineffectiveness., and
defendant fails to allege demonstrable prejudice arising from his counsel's conduct.
There is no record support for the claim that Mr. Doncouse promised that defendant
would receive a sentence of probation and drug counseling due to his "stature and ability".
Br. of Aplt. at 10. To the contrary, at the April 26 sentencing hearing, Mr. Doncouse
expressly requested "reasonable" jail time "with the opportunity to work" without drawing

10

any comment from defendant (R. 82:4/26/00:7-8). Further, there is no record evidence
supporting defendant's claim that neither substitute counsel knew of the promise or that
defendant's entry of his guilty plea was based solely on this promise.3 Br. of Aplt. at 10.
There is no record support for defendant's claims that neither of his substitute counsel
knew anything about the facts or relevant law of this case, that neither counsel discussed the
matters with defendant before each hearing, and that he did not consent to the representation
of substitute counsel. Id at 7,9-11. In fact, the record reflects that defendant was expressly
informed of the anticipated presence of substitute counsel prior to the January 10 and June
28 hearings (R. 39; 83:Tab4:103; 82:4/26/00:2-3,23). Defendant appeared at both hearings
and made no objection to substitute counsel at either, thereafter "unexpectedly]" registering
his first and only objection to Mr. Doncouse's representation at the June 28 hearing (id).

3

To the extent defendant's inclusion of the promise "[a]s a further indication of
total abandonment" by his counsel is actually an attempt to challenge the veracity of his
guilty pleas, his claim should fail for the additional reasons that he did not raise it below
and he fails to adequately brief it on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (appellant's
argument must contain the "contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.").
Defendant cites no authority relating to withdrawal of guilty pleas, instead relating the
promise to his claim of "abandonment" by his counsel. Br. of Aplt. at 10. Further, he
failed to seek withdrawal of the pleas below, and does not claim either plain error or
exceptional circumstances on appeal. Cf State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App. 28,ffl[8-27, 996
P.2d 1065 (reviewing for plain error an unpreserved challenge to entry of a guilty plea),
cert, granted. 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000): see also State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5
(Utah 1995) (requiring that defendant at least allege plain error to obtain review of an
unpreserved claim). As defendant does not provide relevant argument or authority, did
not assert the claim below, and has not presented a plain error argument on appeal, this
Court should refuse to address the veracity of the pleas.
11

Substitute counsel offered in writing to make himself available to defendant for any
questions (R. 39), and defendant voiced no concerns or questions about substitute counsel
or anything else when queried by the court in the various hearings (R. 83:9/6/99/1-2;
83:Tab2:2-3; 83:Tab4:2-3; 83:Tab5:2-3). Further, defendant fails to identify what matters
should have been discussed and how the failure to hold such discussions amounted to the
requisite prejudice under Strickland. Neither does defendant identify the facts or "relevant
law" substitute counsel did not possess or how such information would have benefitted
defendant when attending the numerous hearings to reschedule trial to accommodate Mr.
Doncouse's schedule.
No record evidence exists to support defendant's claim that his counsel did not
provide "basic counseling," did not know the facts of the case or the possible defenses, did
not advise defendant of the relevant law or the State's burden of proof, and did not explain
to defendant the charges against him. Br. of Aplt. at 9-11. Mr. Doncouse apparently handled
the plea negotiations, a plea was reached and entered without objection by defendant, and
Mr. Doncouse handled the initial sentencing stages and reviewed the presentence
investigation report with defendant (R. 48-49; 83:10/6/99:1; 83:Tab2:2; 83:Tab3:3-6;
83:Tab4:2-3; 83:Tab5:l; 82:3/1/00:2-9; 82:4/26/00:2-23). Defendant points to nothing in the
record showing that he did not receive "basic counseling" from Mr. Doncouse in conjunction
with these events. The record further reflects that at the change of plea hearing, the court
explained to defendant the charges, his rights, and the State's burden of proof (R.

12

82:3/1/00:4-9). Defendant indicated that he understood the trial court's explanation,
implying that he had already reviewed the information with counsel or otherwise already
knew the information (R. 82:3/1/00:3-8). Finally, defendant claims no prejudice arising from
his counsel's alleged failure to provide this information to defendant.
Because defendant has failed to provide an adequate record to support his claims, this
Court must presume the regularity of the proceedings below. Litherland. 2000 UT 76 at ffl[
11,17. Additionally, his failure to specifically allege the requisite prejudice arising from his
counsel's absence defeats his claim. See Huggins, 920 P.2d at 1199; Pascuah 804 P.2d at
555.
C

The Record Evidence Relating to Defendant's Claim of Counsel's Failure to
Appear Does Not Support Defendant's Position
Defendant contends that his counsel, Mr. Doncouse, failed to appear on his behalf at

more than one hearing throughout the time he was associated with this case. Br. of Aplt. at
1-2, 7, ll. 4 The record reflects the appearance of substitute counsel on behalf of Mr.
Doncouse at numerous hearings. However, out of the ten hearings which were scheduled to

4

Defendant mentions in passing that there is no written plea agreement. Br. of
Aplt. at 10. While such a document does not appear in the record, it is not required to
enter a valid plea. See State v. Vissen 1999 UT App 19, f 15 & n.l, 973 P.2d 998 (noting
that the trial court has a heightened responsibility to assume the plea is valid where no
plea affidavit is used), overruled on other grounds. 2000 UT 88, 22 P.3d 1242; State v.
Mills. 898 P.2d 819, 823-24 (Utah App. 1995) (same); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)
(noting that requisite findings before accepting plea may be based "on questioning of the
defendant on the record or, if used, an affidavit....") (emphasis added).
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occur between the time counsel was hired and the time he withdrew, counsel appeared at
three hearings, not just one as defendant claims (R. 22-23; 48-49, 50-51; 82:4/26/00:2).
Further, a review of the ten hearings establishes that defense counsel's absence from
many of them does not take his performance outside the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Indeed, the record reflects that the only reason there were so many
hearings at which Mr. Doncouse was absent is because of his unavailability, thereby
requiring scheduling changes in anticipation of his return (see "Statement of the Case,"
supra). It is apparent that the parties agreed to the continuances in order that Mr. Doncouse
could give personal attention to the plea negotiations, and there is no evidence that he did not
do so. Mr. Doncouse presumptively negotiated the agreement because the offer had been
held open pending his return, he had sought a continuance so that he could discuss the matter
with defendant, he had been in contact with the prosecutor (R. 83:2/23/00:3), and the record
reflects no indication that anyone else was involved on defendant's behalf.5 Defendant was
not incarcerated throughout the time of counsel's absence, so was not adversely affected by
the delay.
The record also lays to rest defendant's claim that Mr. Doncouse was unavailable to
consult with or advise him as to this matter, including throughout plea negotiations. Mr.
Doncouse had contact with his office while out of town (R. 83:Tab3:l), and his associate,

5

Defendant has not claimed that he was unable to discuss the plea agreement with
Mr. Doncouse prior to entering the plea, only that he could not discuss it while counsel
was in Brazil. Br. of Aplt. at 9.
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Patrick Kelley, invited defendant to contact the office with any questions (R. 38-39). Had
defendant wished to consult with counsel, his concerns could have been addressed by Mr.
Kelley or relayed to Mr. Doncouse had defendant requested. However, there is no evidence
of any question or concern arising.
Further, Mr. Doncouse was available after his return to the country. The plea offer
was held open and the case was not advanced during Mr. Doncouse's absence. Any
consultation could readily have been accomplished upon Mr. Doncouse's return, after which
he contacted the prosecutor, obtained the plea offer, discussed the plea agreement with
defendant, and ultimately struck a bargain. Defendant identifies no issue which could not
have awaited Mr. Doncouse's return from abroad.

Consequently, this Court should

determine that defendant not only had reasonable access to Mr. Doncouse but that Mr.
Doncouse's availability was not beyond the scope of reasonable professional assistance.
The underlying theme of defendant's claim is his dissatisfaction with his counsel's
performance and his sentence. Nowhere is that more apparent than in his repeated claim that
he did not receive from Mr. Doncouse the "basic presence that the Defendant needed in order
to feel satisfied" that he had been "adequately represented" (R. 82:6/28/00:2). Br. of Aplt.
at 6, 10. That dissatisfaction apparently arose when defendant was sent for a 60-day
diagnostic evaluation at the prison following the April 26 hearing (82:8/2/00:5-11). During
that evaluation, he was told that there were "inconsistencies" that he would have to have his
attorney straighten out (R. 2:8/2/00:2-5). Defendant allegedly tried to contact Mr. Doncouse
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without success, and the diagnostic evaluation ultimately reflected that defendant was
"misrepresenting" and "changing his story" (R. 82:8/2/00:3-4). Only after the evaluation was
complete did defendant assert any dissatisfaction with Mr. Doncouse's representation (R.
82:6/28/00:2-3).

However, dissatisfaction alone does not support a determination of

deficient performance or ineffective assistance.

Defendant's dissatisfaction with his

counsel's performance may be disheartening, but it is not the constitutional standard by
which defense counsel's representation is to be measured.
As defendant has failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice from his
trial counsel's failure to more timely appear on his behalf, his claim fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's convictions and sentences.
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

cTay of August, 2000.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

5g-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection QXa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection
(lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined
in Section 76-10-501 w a s used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (D(aXiv) is guilty of a
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place

knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or

dv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a
third degree felony
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed
d) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools,
(n) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions,
(in) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (4Xa)(i) and (n),
dv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility,
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center,
(vi) in a church or synagogue,
(vn) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto,
(vin) in a public parking lot or structure,
dx) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (vni), or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of
age, regardless of where the act occurs
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this
subsection would have been a first degree felony Imposition or execution
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
probation
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4),
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age, nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a)
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
misdemeanor
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law

(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance
or substances
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research, or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, 6 8; 1972, ch. 22,
* 1; 1977, ch. 29, ft 6; 1979, ch. 12, * 5; 1986,
ch. 146, ft 1; 1986, ch. 196, ft 1; 1987, ch 92,
ft 100; 1987, ch. 190, ft 3; 1988, ch. 96, § 1;
1989, ch. 50, ft 2; 1989, ch 56, $ 1; 1989, ch.
178, ft 1; 1989, ch. 187, 5 2; 1989, ch. 201, ft 1;
1990, ch. 161, ft 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990,
ch. 163, ft 3; 1991, ch. 80, ft 1; 1991, ch. 198,
ft 4; 1991, ch. 268, ft 7; 1995, ch. 284, ft 1;
1996, ch. 1, ft 8; 1997, ch. 64, ft 6; 1998, ch.
139, ft 1; 1999, ch. 12, ft 1; 1999, ch. 303, ft 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend
ment, effective May 4, 1998, deleted former
Subsection (6) which read "Any person who
attempts or conspires to commit any offense
unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction
guilty of one degree less than the maximum

penalty prescribed for that offense," redesignat
mg the other subsections accordingly
The 1999 amendment by ch 12, effective May
3,1999, substituted "in the immediate presence
o P for "with" in Subsection (4XaXx) and made
minor stylistic changes in Subsections (2) and
(4)
The 1999 amendment by ch 303, effective
May 3, 1999, added Subsection (lXc), redesig
nating former Subsection (lXc) as (lXd), substituted "chapter" for "subsection" in Subsection (2XaXi), and made a minor stylistic
change
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel
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Prohibited acts — Second degree felony.

/i) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation,
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage
m a clandestine laboratory operation,
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation,
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act,
blowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distributed or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation,
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation,
(0 produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized
under Title 68, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, or
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within
this state or any other location
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second
degree felony.
Bftory: C. 1963, 58-374-4, enacted by L.
« t c k 156,1 4; 1667, eh. 64,1 11.
Amendment Notes. — TTie 1997 amend•eat, effective May 5,1997, added Subsections

(1X0 and (g) and made stylistic changes accordingly
Croee Reference*. — Sentencing for felomes, ft 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301

M-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony.
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(lXa), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of
•firstdegree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following
uxhtions occurred in conjunction with that violation:
(a) possession of a firearm;
(b) use of a booby trap;
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dangerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was
created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the
environment;
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place
*ithin 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school,
(e) any phase of the clandestine laboratory operation or production or
manufacture of a controlled or counterfeit substance involved a person less
than 18 years of age;
(f) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced anv am,*,
specified controlled substance, or
«*°unt of t
(g) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the produ**
uc
cocaine base or methamphetamine base
won of
(2) If the tner of fact finds that two or more of the conditions h f^
Subsections (lXa) through (g) of this section occurred in conjunction w *u m
lUi th
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony
«
(a) probation shall not be granted;
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended a
(c) the
the n
n u r t shall
shflll n
n f enter
onfor a
a judgment
i i J i m t A n f for
G%» a
a lower
1/%**,»_ category
— i.
(c)
court
not
of. off'' n d
Hietory: C. 1963, 66-97(1-6, enacted by L.
ltW, ch. 166,1 5; 1667, ch. 64,1 IS.
Amendment Note* - The 1997 amendment, effective May 5 1997, substituted -(e), or
(f Tfor-or (e)" in Subeection (1) and ineerted -or

production or manufacture of a C M M I _.
counterfeit subrfance" in S u b ^ o T ^ *
Croee-Refereticee. _ S e n b m ^ J 2 ?
„*., | | 76-3-201 76-3-203 76?ZR ** **>
'•"*-"«. /w-Wd, 76-3-301

